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A NEW HOPE FOR THE REPUBLIC
ABSTRACT
This study illustrates the ideological origins of fair
trade in the Virginia Port Bill of 1784.
Drafted by James
Madison when he was a member of the commerce committee in the
Virginia House of Delegates, the Port Bill restricted the
trade between Virginia's planters and foreign merchants to
five enumerated ports.
British merchants enjoyed a monopoly
in the tobacco trade before the war, and their unlimited
access to the Chesapeake market caused many Virginia planters
to fall deeply into debt.
After the war, when the British
merchants returned to the Chesapeake, Madison wished to
prevent further indebtedness by forcing foreign merchants to
compete against each other for contracts with planters in
legally designated ports.
The Port Bill was not implemented until 1787, and after
the ratification of the Federal Constitution in 1788, the law
was rendered unconstitutional. While the bill achieved only
limited legislative success, the debate over the Port Bill in
1784-1787 provided the earliest definitions of free trade in
the American political tradition.
The prohibition of
mercantile activity in places where trade once flourished
could easily be seen as a protectionist policy.
However,
Madison won support for the bill on the grounds that it
promoted free trade. Madison believed the Port Bill provided
the necessary legislative action to forcibly create an open
port and a free market by insuring competition through equal
access.
His definition of "free trade" thus outlined a
principle that is better understood as "fair trade."
The recognition of fair, rather than free, trade as a
fundamental tenet in the emerging ideology of classical
liberalism establishes an important principle within American
political thought. The realization that American policymakers
advocated fair trade in espousing the dogma of "free trade"
explains how in the golden age of classical liberalism, the
United States maintained protectionist trade policies and high
tariff walls.
How the Virginia delegates expressed their
support for the Port Bill of 1784 thus reveals important
insights into the actual meaning and subsequent development
of "free trade" in American history.
RICHARD SMITH CHEW III
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY
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A NEW HOPE FOR THE REPUBLIC

CHAPTER ONE
A NEW HOPE FOR THE REPUBLIC

James Madison was disappointed.
significantly

to

the

revolutionary

While John Adams contributed
cause

during

the

war,

the

publication of his Defence of the Constitutions of Government of
the United States of America confirmed Madison's suspicions about
Adams's political beliefs.
"unfriendly
accused

to

Adams

Constitutions

Complaining about the frequent comments

republicanism"
of
of

writing
his

a

throughout

"mock

Country"

and

the

defence"
then

of

Defence,
the

attacking

Madison

"Republican
them

with

a

shameless display of rhetoric and sophistry.1 Others maligned the
Defence

as

"one of the most deep wrought systems of political

deception that ever was penned by the ingenuity of man," and James
McClurg jested that Adams's "optics have been too weak to withstand
the glass of European courts."2

Aware of the heated criticism

provoked by his work, Adams turned to Benjamin Franklin in 1787,
explaining that the Defence "contains my confession of political

\James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (June 6, 1787), The Papers
of Thomas Jefferson, edited by Julian Boyd, (Princeton University
Press, Princeton, 1950-), XI, p. 402
2James McClurg to James Madison, (August 22, 1787), and the
Richmond Virginia Independent Chronicle. (August 15, 1787), both
quoted in Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution. (Boston,
Little, Brown and Co., Cambridge, 1947), p. 816-818.
2

3
faith, and, if it is heresy,
communion.

I shall,

I suppose, be cast out of

But it is the only sense in which I am or ever was a

Republican.113
The

confusion

and

disagreement

among

eighteenth-century

intellectuals concerning the definition of "republican" has focused
the attention of many political historians on the post-revolution
period.

While

most

historians

of

the

Revolution

accept

that

"republicanism" provided a defining ideology for the rebellion in
the

1770s,

a

consensus

does

not

exist

over

whether

or

not

republicanism continued to dominate political thought during the
early national period.4

Those who contend that republicanism did

not survive the constitutional convention of 1787 insist that a
nineteenth-century version of liberalism was ascendant during the
1790s.

The debate over the legacy of the Revolution thus turns on

3John Adams to Benjamin Franklin, (January 27, 1787),
The Works of Beniamin Franklin, edited by John Bigelow, (New York,
1904), XI, p. 298-299.
4For those who argue that republicanism continued to dominate
political life in the early national period, see Lance Banning, The
Jeffersonian Persuasion:
The Evolution of a Party Ideology.
(Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1978), Forrest MacDonald, The
Presidency of Thomas Jefferson. (University of Kansas Press,
Lawrence, 1976), and Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic;
Political
Economy in Jeffersonian America. (University of North Carolina
Press, Chapel Hill, 1980).
For those who argue that liberalism
superseded republicanism soon after the ratification of the Federal
Constitution, see Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order:
The Republican Vision of the 1790s. (New York University Press,
New York, 1984) and Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical
Imagination. (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1992), John
Patrick Diggins, The Lost Soul of American Politics: Virtue. SelfInterest. and the Foundations of Liberalism. (New York, 1985), and
Isaac Kramnick,
"Republican Revisionism Revisited," American
Historical Review. LXXXVII (1982), p. 629-664.

4
the question of the political configuration of the 1790s, and the
ideological origins of the American liberal tradition.

To build

a consensus, we must retrace the origins of the core beliefs of
classical liberalism.
Central to the classical liberalism of the nineteenth-century
was a belief in "free trade," and the earliest legislative battle
over this doctrine in America was the Virginia Port Bill of 1784.
While the question of free trade and the direction of United States
trade policies during the nineteenth-century were not ultimately
decided by the Virginia legislature during the 1780s, the debate
over the port bill did provide the earliest definitions of free
trade during the formative years of American liberalism.

How the

Virginia delegates expressed their support for this doctrine in the
1780s

reveals

important

insights

into

the

actual

meaning

and

subsequent development of that doctrine in American history.
The delegates assembled in Richmond in May 1784 enjoyed the
early hints of summer, as the smell of cherries and strawberries
renewed the spirit of the marketplace.
distant

mountains

commonwealth.5

while

peach

A year had

American Revolution.

trees

passed

Hickories budded on the
blossomed

since

the

throughout

conclusion

of

the
the

No longer threatened by the destructive force

Meteorological Journal for Orange County, Virginia, The Papers
of James Madison, edited by William Hutchinson and William Rachal,
(Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962-), VIII, p. 519.
Madison
began keeping the journal at the urging of Jefferson, who wrote to
him on March 16, 1784, "I wish you would keep a diary under the
following...(meteorological charts)...It will be an amusement to
you and may become useful." (Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of
James Madison. VIII, p. 16).

5
of the British armies, many Virginians reflected on the state of
the commonwealth.

The end of the long and bitter struggle with

Great Britain realized the hopes

and

fears of

a revolutionary

generation, and the Old Dominion could claim a significant share
of the credit for victory.

"Virginia furnished the country's most

eloquent spokesmen for freedom and equality," a Virginian drafted
the

Declaration

Continental

of

Army

Independence

that

won

and

another

independence"

for

"commanded
the

the

colonies.

Virginia's tobacco "helped to buy American independence."6 However,
independence remained a hollow reality and an unfulfilled dream for
those in the marketplace.
During the war,

Virginians believed political

independence

assured economic independence and control of the commonwealth's
commercial destiny.

With the cloak of mercantilism lifted from the

Chesapeake after the war, planters expected merchants from all of
Europe and America to bid up the price of tobacco in the spirit of
free competition.

The British monopoly on importing consumer goods

would thus end, and competition in an open market would determine
prices on foreign manufactures.

Wartime austerity would yield to

commercial prosperity and the promise of a republican society.7
Mark Lynch, a merchant in Nantes with connections to Philip Mazzei,
the Virginia agent in Tuscany during the war, assured James Madison

6Edmund Morgan, American Slavery. American Freedom: The Ordeal
of Colonial Virginia. (WW Norton, New York, 1975), p. 6
7Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic:
Political Economy
Jeffersonian America. (WW Norton, New York, 1982), p. 76-77.

in

6

that

"every article

necessary

in America,

can be procured

and

shipped here [America] on reasonable terms, which I dare say you
will experience hereafter."8
The problems of post-war readjustment in Virginia dampened the
confidence of its leaders in achieving economic independence from
the

British.

The

materialize.

The

free

trade

Farmers

the

General

planters
refused

envisioned
to

did

purchase

not

tobacco

directly from Virginians after the close of hostilities, preferring
the more familiar business of British mercantile houses.9
in

Council

of

December

1783

stipulated

that

American

Orders
tobacco

destined for reexport be admitted and warehoused duty-free in Great
Britain.10 The continuance of the traditional British monopoly on
the importation of American tobacco into France thus foiled the
plans of Chesapeake planters to introduce direct American trade to
Europe's largest market.
a

flood

of

British

The slumping export market, combined with

imports

to

meet

pent

up

American

demand,

resulted in depression and economic uncertainty.
This interpretation of Virginia's post-war depression was not
accepted

by

everyone.

The

Chevalier

de

la

Luzerne,

a French

8Mark Lynch to James Madison, (February 15, 1783), Hutchinson
and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VI, p. 243. Philip Mazzei
was the commercial agent and wartime financier for Virginia in
Tuscany, 1778-1782.
9David Ross and other Virginia merchants to Thomas Jefferson,
(October 18, 1785), Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. VIII,
p. 650-651.
10Lewis Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United
States to 1860. (The Carnegie Institute, Washington, 1933),
II, p. 600.
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minister to America, rejected claims that British merchants and the
Farmers General were to blame for the deteriorating situation, and
insisted upon an alternative explanation when he wrote to Congress
in September 1783.

He explained that the "Americans by admitting

too precipitately English vessels

in their ports have deprived

themselves of a powerful weapon to induce England to a conclusion
of the Treaty

[of commerce]11 on free trade terms.11

Americans

authored

mercantile

traffic

their
to

own

proceed

commercial
before

crisis.

diplomats

Thus,

the

Allowing

determined

the

proper terms of that trade compromised the commercial standing of
the United States in Europe.12

The accusation struck a familiar

chord with many Virginians.
American diplomats had begun discussions over a treaty of
commerce with Britain in 1783,

and in May,

the "project...[had]

been reported by the Secretary [of] foreign affairs" and was placed
"in the hands of a committee."

The objectives of the American

“Chevalier de la Luzerne to Congress, (September 18, 1783),
Journals of the Continental Congress. 1774-1789. edited by Chauncey
Ford, (Washington, 1904-1937), XXV, p. 589.
“This was especially true in light of the collapse of the Earl
of Shelburne's government on February 24, 1783.
A week earlier,
on February 17, 1783, Shelburne delivered before parliament that
"situated as we are between the old world and the new, and between
the southern and northern Europe, all that we ought to covet upon
the earth is free trade, and fair equality.
With more industry,
with more enterprise, with more capital than ant other trading
nation upon earth, it ought to be our constant cry, let every
market be open, let us meet our rivals fairly, and we ask no more."
fCobbett's Parliamentary History of England:
From the Norman
Conquest in 1066 to the Year 1803. (T.C. Hansard, 1806-1820, 36
volumes), XXIII, cols. 409-410.
The new administration did not
share Shelburne's enthusiasm and respect for open ports and
markets.
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envoys included a direct trade between the United States and the
West Indies, and "a right of carrying from [the] West Indies to all
other

parts

of

the

world."13

The

American

ministers

clearly

intended to secure a liberal and free trade with the entire British
Empire.

However, the diplomats failed to reach an agreement before

Thomas Jefferson met with the British minister Mr.

Hartley

December

the

1783.

At

this meeting,

the delegates

to

in

treaty

discussions received word that "a vessel arrived in France from
Philadelphia bringing intelligence that all our ports were thrown
open to British vessels."

Soon after, "Mr. Hartley, who wished to

establish a liberal system of commerce with us, then went to London
hoping to return shortly and renew the commercial discussions."
The American ministers predicted even then that it was "doubtful
whether he
before

Mr.

(would)

return at all."14

Hartley's

vision

for

the

More than a decade passed
Atlantic

trade

would

be

realized.
With merchants from Glasgow to Bristol crowding into colonial
harbors,

the

Chevalier

de

la

Luzerne's

observations

appeared

“James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (May 13, 1783), Hutchinson
and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VII, p. 39
“Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Harrison, (December 17, 1783),
Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. VI, p. 388-389

9
difficult to deny.15 Edmund Randolph observed that "several British
vessels have

arrived

in our

rivers:

some

of which

affect to

entitle themselves to an entry by distress, and others in right of
commerce upon the cessation of hostilities."16
echoed this remark that

Edmund Pendleton

"our trade is almost at a stand,

many

Vessels lying in the Rivers, not yet permitted to trade."17 James
Madison even received a letter from a loyalist merchant residing
in London inquiring as to the commercial situation in Virginia
following the war.

"Give me as particular Account as you can of

the Regulations," asked Joseph Chew, "I earnestly wish to know the
situation of the Trade

in Virginia and the demand for British

Goods.1,18 By the end of May 1783, Virginia's ports were fully open
to British ships, and Randolph deplored "the general ardor after
those commodities which public acts have so lately proscribed."
Benjamin Harrison expressed similar concerns to the delegates
in

Philadelphia

in

November

1783,

wishing

that

"Congress

had

entered into some general recommendations for counteracting the

15Some exiled native loyalists returned to Virginia prior to
the arrival of the British merchants.
The local patriots in
Norfolk did not greet them warmly, though their presence was not
treated as a British scheme to subvert the economy of Virginia.
See Tom Costa, Economic Development and Political Authority:
Norfolk. Virginia. Merchant-Maaistrates. 1736-1800, (unpubl. PhD.
Diss., The College of William and Mary, 1991), p. 280-290
16Edmund Randolph to James Madison, (May 9, 1783),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VII, p. 33.
17Edmund Pendleton to James Madison, (May 10, 1783),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VII, p. 37.
18Joseph Chew to James Madison, (November 6, 1783),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VII, p. 399.
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British regulations on trade."
would

not

manufactures

be

amiss

to

altogether

He speculated that "perhaps it

prohibit
'till

they

the

importation

of

their

open

their

to

us."19

ports

Randolph and the Chevalier agreed that Americans squandered their
national reputation "in the opinion of those people, who beyond the
water have admired our self-denial, by a hunger and thirst after
cheese and porter."20
The failure to secure a commercial treaty with Great Britain
contributed to the post-war depression in the colonies.

In the

midst of economic dislocation, the return of the British merchants
reminded

Virginians

of

the

dominance

that

achieved in the tobacco trade before the war.

Glasgow

merchants

Glasgow achieved its

commanding position in the Chesapeake after the British Tobacco Act
of

1751 established

"a rigid system of controls

internal movement of tobacco" in Great Britain.

governing the

This act placed

duties and imposed restrictions on the importation, warehousing,
and sale of American-grown tobacco in Great Britain.21

To insure

customers before the Revolution, the Scots provided planters with
nearly unlimited credit.

During the

1750s,

the

large Glasgow

merchant houses, which benefitted from economies of scale, began

19Benjamin Harrison to the Virginia delegates in Congress,
(November 14, 1783), Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. VI,
p. 354.
20Edmund Randolph to James Madison, (May 24, 1783),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VII, p. 73.
21Jacob Price, "The Rise of Glasgow in the Chesapeake Tobacco
Trade, 1707-1775," The William and Marv Quarterly. 3d series, XXI
(1954), p. 179-199.
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to dominate the Chesapeake trade.

By the end of the decade lesser

British ports could no longer compete, and only London remained as
an alternative to the Firth of Clyde.22
agents

in Glasgow and London,

The French maintained

and some

"Glaswegians made their

purchases in America with the French market only in mind."23
expanding

number

Chesapeake

of

tobacco

Scots
a

merchants

speculative

during

the

enterprise

1760s

for

The

rendered

the

Glasgow

merchants, and the liberal use of credit encouraged indebtedness
and compromised the economic independence of the planters.
This
commerce.

situation

exacerbated a chronic

problem for Virginia

The highly decentralized river system provided a large

number of ports of entry for the trade in tobacco.

There were

almost as many harbors as plantations, and since the seventeenth
century,

transactions

occurred

almost

on

seventeenth century,

between

the

foreign

landings

of

merchants

the

and

plantations.

"every planter owned a wharf;

planters
In

the

indeed the

strongest reason after fertility of the soil which influenced him
in selecting a tract of land was that it fronted on the water

22Jacob Price argues that the institutional structure of the
French tobacco market encouraged the extension of credit in
Virginia.
Thus, the demands of the French market may have
encouraged Parliament to pass the Tobacco Act of 1751 to facilitate
the creation of a debt cycle.
See Jacob Price, "The Economic
Growth of the Chesapeake and the European Market, 1697-1775,"
Journal of Economic History. XXIV, (1964), p. 496-511
“Price, "The Rise of Glasgow in the Chesapeake Tobacco Trade,
1707-1775," The William and Mary Quarterly. 3d Series, XXI (1954),
p. 191.
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highway."24

The

decentralized

combination

river

system

of

extensive

isolated

the

credit
planter

and

the

from

the

marketplace where merchants would have had to bid up the price of
tobacco

to

competition,

win

contracts.

British

dominance

suppressed

promoting indebtedness and economic dependency for

planters.25 The lack of a commercial center disadvantaged planters
who "got in debt to the Merchants who set their own prices," and
the return of these merchants threatened to renew the debt cycle
in Virginia.26

The commercial disadvantages

merchant monopolies angered George Mason.

that resulted from

He spared no sympathy

against the merchants in a formal protest of the attempt to repeal
legislation barring extensive credits.

Mason claimed those "who

promoted the said Petition [to repeal]" did so "in Order to dispose
of their goods at exorbitant Prices," and to continue selling goods

24Philip Alexander Bruce, Economic History of Virginia in the
Seventeenth-Century. (MacMillan & Co., New York, 1896), II, esp.
p. 524-561.
Also see Albert Giesecke, AmericanCommercial
Legislation Before 1789. (Burt Franklin, New York, 1910), p. 102.
25While Virginia/s debt did sore from one million pounds
sterling to over two million between 1757 and 1775 as a result of
the Scots factors, tobacco process actually rose from 1750-1775,
and "income from tobacco per laborer rose more than twice as
rapidly after 1750 as before that year."
See Allan Kulikoff,
Tobacco and Slaves:
The Development of Southern Cultures in the
Chesapeake. 1680-1800. (Univ. of North Carolina Press for the
Institute of Early American History and Culture, Chapel Hill,
1986), esp. p. 119-127.
26James Madison to James Monroe, (June 4, 1786),
The Papers of James Madison. IX, p. 74
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"upon long Credit, on open Accounts."27
The lack of a commercial treaty with Great Britain closed the
Americans

out

of

both, the

French

and

the

British

mercantile

systems, and ruined the possibility of free trade between America
and Europe.

While some blamed the return of the British merchants

for the depression,

and others

criticized the

inaction of the

American Congress, or the impatience of the American consumer, all
could agree on the commercial

consequences

for Virginia.

The

renewal of British dominance and the flood of imports to meet pent
up demand threatened to undermine the economic independence of the
newly liberated colonies.

In July 1784, matters worsened when

Spain closed the Mississippi to American navigation and asserted
territorial claims over a considerable area between the river and
Georgia.

The result was foreign influence and exploitation in the

West and a disorganized and disunited commercial predicament in
the East.
Confronted

with

these

issues,

the

Virginia

legislature

selected a new committee of commerce in the Spring of 1784 to
settle upon a course of action to lead the state to recovery and
toward economic growth.
in less than a month;

The committee submitted their resolution
given the state of Virginia's commerce in

1784, the prompt return was no surprise.

On May 28, 1784, the

27"Fairfax County Petition Protesting Repeal of the Act to
Prevent Extensive Credits," (June 18, 1783), The Papers of George
Mason. 1725-1792. edited by Robert Rutland, (University of North
Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1970; published for the Institute of
Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg), II, p. 785
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commerce

committee

legislature.

prepared

to

introduce

their

plan

to

the

The delegates resumed their seats late in the session

as the turn in the seasons illuminated the assembly hall.28
The house, according to the order of the day, resolved itself
into a committee of the whole on the state of the commonwealth to
hear the report from the committee of commerce.

"After sometime

spent therein," the Speaker of the House resumed his chair and
recognized the representative for the committee.
and acknowledged the Speaker.

Mr. Tazewell rose

Standing in his place among the

delegates from every county in Virginia, he lifted the resolution
before him, and addressed the house.
"Resolved, that it is the opinion of this committee, that all
ships and other vessels trading to this Commonwealth from foreign
ports,

ought to be

restricted from entering certain ports

for

loading and unloading.1129
While

the

commerce

committee

did

not

specify

the

actual

details of the measure, the delegates in attendance understood its
general intent.

The resolution called for the establishment of a

few specified ports in Virginia as legal markets for all trade with
foreign merchants.

Restricting access of foreign merchants to a

few towns would centralize economic activities within entrepot
areas.

The proposal thus risked dividing the consensus over the

28Journal of the House of Delegates of the Commonwealth of
Virginia (Thomas w. White, Richmond, 1828; hereafter referred to

15
moral

dimensions

of

economic

system of political economy.

life

by

reshaping the

republican

Several of the delegates even favored

the restriction of all trade to Norfolk alone, a limitation that
would have transformed the economy of the entire region.30 However,
the possible expansion of Norfolk or Alexandria into a southern
Philadelphia paled in comparison to the ideological implications
of restricting trade between planters and merchants.

At first

glance, the proposed Port Bill of 1784 appeared to sacrifice free
and open trade with Europe for protection against the monopolizing
tendencies of foreign merchants.
energetic

use

of

government

For many Revolutionaries,

against

"free

trade"

the

forfeited

republican principles in favor of a new mercantilism.
After

completing

the

address,

Mr.

Tazewell

delivered

the

resolution to the clerk's table, where it was read once more into
the record.

James Madison listened as the words he helped to write

less than a week before echoed through the assembly hall.

Recently

returned from the Congress at Philadelphia, Madison provided the
group of ten Virginians on the new commerce committee with a focus
for their policy.
republic,

Madison

Aware of the growing economic crisis in the
recognized

that

the

uncertainty

in Virginia

mandated unusual action.31 The return of the English merchants and

30James Madison may be included as one of those who favored the
establishment of Norfolk as the only port of entry. See the letter
of Edmund Randolph to Thomas Jefferson, (May 15, 1784), Boyd,
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. VII, p. 260-261.
31James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (December 10, 1783),
Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. VII, p. 377.
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Scots factors brought dependence and debt once again to Virginia.
The combined effect on tobacco prices of western expansion and
British

commercial

dominance

contributed

to

the

need

legislative action against foreign mercantile interests.

for

Merchant

dominance over the planters7 lives concerned Madison more than any
other consideration.

He believed the British strategy after the

war was an intentional effort to monopolize the Chesapeake trade
for the purpose of encouraging debt, dependence and economic ruin.
He postulated that "the ready admission she [Great Britain] found
into our commerce without paying any price for it has suggested the
policy of aiming at the entire benefit of it." 32
Madison may have been eager to deflect any blame away from
Congress for the disastrous course of trade after the war, as he
served as a Virginia delegate to Congress in 1783.

However, he did

have cause beyond simple self-interest to blame the British and not
the Americans.

Writing from Philadelphia at the time, he believed

that "the other nations of Europe seem to have more honorable views
towards our

commerce,

sundry advances

having been made

to our

Ministers on that subject."33
Madison believed the Port Bill would solve five fundamental
problems in Virginia7s economy.
the

enumerated ports

forced

First, limiting foreign trade to

European merchants

to

compete

32James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (September 20, 1783),
Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, V I , p . 338.
33James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (December 10, 1783),
Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. VI, p. 377.
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Virginia's business.
by

promoting

an

Competition discouraged debt and dependency

open

concentrating merchants

market.

planters

Madison

believed

that

in a few ports would create a seller's

market in the short-run.
Virginia's

Second,

Limiting the access of merchants to

would

appreciate

the

price

of

tobacco

promised to end the depression of the early 1780s.

and

Continued

western expansion threatened to wipe out these short-term gains
with a long-term depreciation in the price of tobacco over the
following decade.

However, Madison believed that the Port Bill's

initial upward pressure on prices would anticipate the depreciation
from expanding supply, and thus stabilize the market in the longrun.

Third, Madison hoped the removal of the debt cycle and the

continued profitability of tobacco would support a virtuous yeoman
class and insure the viability of a republican political economy
in Virginia.

Fourth, the elimination of the debt cycle would also

solidify the credit position of Virginians,

and facilitate the

settlement of outstanding debts to foreign creditors in Europe.
Finally, Madison hoped to encourage the development of a native
class

of

retailers

to

replace

the

Scots

factors

along

the

Tidewater.
Madison

was

convinced

that

whenever

British

merchants

negotiated directly with an indebted planter, the price of tobacco
suffered.

In a free market, competition would have appreciated the

price to its

"natural” level.

He observed that while tobacco

prices in Virginia in 1784 were high, ranging from 36/hundredweight
to 42/hundredweight, the price in Philadelphia and Baltimore was

18
15/. to 20/. higher on the Virginia staple.34 He was aware of the
difference
House,

in prices

who

sold

Philadelphia.

from his

tobacco

for

own

transactions

the

Madison

through

family

Samuel

account

in

Although he would rather have sold his tobacco in

Alexandria, the closest Virginia port, economic necessity required
the services of Mr. House.35
Madison's personal transactions in Philadelphia highlighted
a problem often overlooked by his fellow planters in Virginia.

The

price of tobacco following the war remained high for some time, but
the

continuing

profits.

British

dominance

robbed

Virginia

of

enormous

He could only lament that Virginia's "trade was never

more completely monopolised by Great Britain when it was under the
direct control of the British Parliament" than it was after the

34James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (August 20, 1784),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VIII, p. 103.
Richard Henry Lee cautioned Madison that the higher prices in
Philadelphia were the result of "sinking speculators," and not of
European inequity.
(RHL to JM, (August 11, 1785), VIII, p. 340).
Madison discounted this theory as misinformed. (JM to Ambrose
Madison, (December 15, 1785), VIII, p. 443).
Furthermore, the
price of tobacco was higher, sometimes substantially higher in
Virginia than in Maryland during the entire period 1750-1775, when
the Glasgow merchants were at their height. (Kulikoff, Tobacco and
Slaves, p. 80). Madison does not account for this when he claims
the commercial center at Baltimore would necessarily receive
competitive prices.
Finally, a large part of the reason for the
fall in tobacco prices in 1785-1786 was the disastrous contract
between Robert Morris and the Farmers General, and not the British
merchants.
Morris negotiated a three year contract for 20,000
hgd/year from 1785-1788 at 24/. (see Thomas Jefferson to Vergennes,
(August 15, 1785), Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. VIII,
p. 385-393.)
35James Madison to Ambrose Madison, (September 8, 1786),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. IX, p. 120-121.
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war.36 Unfortunately, "the price of our Staple since the peace is
another cause of inattention in the planters to the dark side of
our commercial affairs."37 Madison warned that the presence of the
Glasgow merchants would drive the price down, and over the next two
years,

the fall in the price of tobacco seemed to merit these

fears.

By Christmas eve 1785, the price reached the break-even

point at 20/., and the depression continued in Virginia.38 The Port
Bill promised to end the downward pressure on tobacco prices and
alleviate the commonwealth's beleaguered economy.
The

expansion

to

the

West

also

threatened

to

make

the

cultivation of tobacco unprofitable for the independent planter in
the East.

Madison recognized that "it [is] becoming more apparent

every day that the richness of the soil and the fitness of the
climate on the western waters will in a few years both reduce the
price and engross the culture of [tobacco]."39

As the amount of

36James Madison to James Monroe, (June 21, 1785),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VIII, p. 307
37James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (August 20, 1785),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VIII, p. 344
38James Madison to James Madison, Sr., (December 24, 1785),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VIII, p. 454.
The break-even point of 20/. was identified by Forrest MacDonald,
E Pluribus Unum:
The Formation of the American Republic.17761790, (Boston, 1965), p. 70.
Madison kept a vigil over the
fluctuations in the price of tobacco in this period.
See JM to
Ambrose Madison, (January 21, 1786), VIII, p. 470;
JM to Thomas
Jefferson, (January 22, 1786), VIII, p. 481;
JM to Thomas
Jefferson, (March 18, 1786), VIII, p. 503;
JM to James Monroe,
(May 12, 1786), IX, p. 50.
39James Madison to Thomas Jefferson,
(August 20, 1784),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VIII, p. 104.
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unsettled land in the trans-Appalachian region was roughly egual
to the amount of settled land in the east, he assumed that the
population of the country would double.40
double

the

amount

of

tobacco

This expansion would

produced

in

America

without

concurrent increase in the number of markets for the crop.

a

Since

the steady demand "for Tobacco, indigo, rice, hemp, Indian Corn,
lumber &c produced by the U.S. for exportation will neither precede
or keep pace with their increase, the price of them must naturally
sink in favor of those who consume them."41
In 1784, Madison calculated that without a commercial center
like Baltimore or Philadelphia,

the steady

increase

in settled

western lands would depreciate tobacco prices from 35/. to under
20/. within twenty years.

This alone did not compromise the long

term profitability of tobacco because prices would remain above the
break-even point.

However, the renewed British dominance in the

Chesapeake after the war had already driven tobacco prices down to
20/. by December 1785.

Thus any additional downward pressure on

prices from western expansion represented an immediate threat to
the profitability of tobacco in the 1780s.
western

expansion and British dominance

The combined effect of
on agricultural

prices

40James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (August 20, 1784),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VIII, p. 106107. The notion of the population doubling was a commonly accepted
belief in the late colonial period.
See Drew McCoy, "Benjamin
Franklin's Vision of a Republican Political Economy for America,"
The William and Mary Quarterly. 3d series, XXXV (1978),
esp. p. 608-610.
41James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (August 20, 1784),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VIII, p. 107
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would force Virginians to either abandon tobacco for manufacturing
or accept an increasing level of debt to maintain an agricultural
economy.

However,

if ports of entry could be restricted to a

limited number of markets, prices would first appreciate to 50/.
or

60/.

in

the

1780s
then

with

only

the

decline

or

30/.

expansion.

While the Port Bill could not prevent a fall in tobacco

into

25/.

mercantile

and

profit margins

to

British

dominance,

prices from 1785-1810,

fall

of

from

western

by moderating the fall it would maintain

the

next

century.

The

republic

would

be

preserved.42
Tobacco
insured
Virginia.

the

also supported an
viability

of

a

independent yeoman class,
republican

political

which

economy

in

Incorporated from the radical Whig tradition of early

eighteenth-century

England,

the

doctrine

of

"republicanism"

stressed the balance between prerogative and liberty as necessary
to a stable social order.

When governments invested all power in

the royal prerogative of the monarch,
tyranny.

society quickly fell into

When governments invested all power in the liberty of the

people, society quickly fell into anarchy.43 In America before the
42Madison believed that western expansion was essential to
avoid the erosion of virtue from commercial development.
By
expanding through space, he hoped to evade economic development
through time.
However, the continued influence of the merchants
threatened to undermine the basis for this expansion.
See McCoy,
The Elusive Republic, esp. p. 185-259
43For a further discussion of republicanism see Richard Price,
Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty. (London, 1776),
Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution.
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1967), J.G.A. Pocock, The
Machiavellian Moment:____ Florentine Political Thought and the
Atlantic Republican Tradition. (Princeton University Press,
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war,

royal

appointments

undermined

the

social

and

political

hierarchy of the colonial elites, and the interference of the Scots
threatened the economic sovereignty of the planters.

While the

Revolution removed the king, it had only exiled the Scots, and in
1783, they had returned.
The accumulation of debts to British merchants violated a
basic premise of republicanism.
a planter's

ability

to

Economic dependency compromised

sacrifice

greater good of the whole."44

"individual

interests

to

the

Indebtedness could force a planter

to adopt political positions favorable to the commercial desires
of the British merchants in exchange for an alleviation of his
financial burden.

The fear of this kind of corruption prompted the

Revolutionaries to designate ownership of property as the agency
of

liberation.

Possession of property meant

others for support?

independence from

independence guaranteed a citizen's ability

to pursue the public good, because he was no longer compelled to
follow the private
dominance
threatened

achieved
to

interests of those who supported him.
by

the

destabilize

British
the

merchants

republican

after

economy.

the

The
war

Just

as

"Americans in 1776 were resolved to destroy the capacity of their
rulers ever again to determine the ranks of the social order,"

Princeton, 1975), and esp. Gordon Wood, The Creation of the
American Republic. 1776^1787. (WW Norton, New York, 1972).
For
thorough review of the literature on republicanism, see Robert E.
Shalhope, "Republicanism and Early American Historiography," The
William and Mary Quarterly. 3d Series, XXXIX, (October 1982),
p. 334-356.
44Gordon Wood, Creation of the American Republic, p. 15, 53
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Virginians in 1784 sought to eliminate the power of the British
merchants to control their economy.45
The credit position of Virginia in Europe presented another
problem in the commonwealth's economy.

Madison complained that

before the war, Scots traders passed "the essential legislation"
for Virginia at court days in Williamsburg, when they set tobacco
prices,

fixed exchange rates,

and settled accounts.46

After the

war, Madison was aware that the indebtedness of the planters and
"the

monopoly

[of

[Virginia]...left
Randolph

echoed

the

Scots]

wounds
these

which

which

fears

are

about

formerly
not

yet

American

tyrannized
healed."
debts

to

over

Edmund
British

creditors "if recoverable immediately, may they not endanger us,
by the possibility of a relapse into the arms of Great Britain if
not by a restoration of dependence,

at least by a destructive

connection?"47 Madison agreed that "the numerous debts due from the
people, and which...they are immediately liable for" provided the
mechanism by which the merchants could regain their control over
Virginia in the courts and "may possibly be the instruments for
reestablishing their dependence."48

For this reason,

the courts

45Wood, Creation of the American Republic, p. 148.
46Marc Egnal and Joseph Ernst, "An Economic Interpretation of
the American Revolution," The William and Marv Quarterly. 3d
series, XXIX (1972), p. 25-26.
47Edmund Randolph to James Madison, (March 29, 1783),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VI, p. 416
48James Madison to Edmund Randolph, (May 20, 1783),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VII, p. 62
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remained closed in Virginia throughout the 1780s.
debate

over

discussion

the

to

the

opening
debate

of

the

over

courts

the

Port

However, the

provided
Bill.

a

parallel

While

Madison

supported the legal address of outstanding debts, he hoped that the
issue would not become a chronic problem in Virginia.

The opening

of the courts would have demonstrated commitment on behalf of the
planters to honor their debts to British merchants and at the same
time maintain the confidence of foreign lenders in extending future
credit to Virginians.
produce

To assure that future credit would not

a second debt cycle,

the

Port Bill

concentrated trade

between planters and foreign merchants in specified locations where
competition would eliminate British dominance.
Port Bill
fortify

Both measures, the

and the proposed reopening of the courts,

the

commercial

standing

of Virginia

before

served to
the world.

Advocates for the Port Bill hoped to settle the old guestion of
debts and dependency in a respectable way and eliminate what they
believed to have been the root cause of the debt cycle.

The Port

Bill complemented the move to reopen the courts and satisfied the
ideological fears of republicans.
Concentrating the export trade at Norfolk also encouraged the
development of a native class of retailers to replace the Scots
factors

along

the

Tidewater.

Virginia's "human capital.”

The

factor

system

undermined

The dominance of Scots factors and

English merchants who traded directly with planters inhibited the
development of a large mercantile class.

The system eliminated

competition from independent middlemen and drained the Chesapeake
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of its "ablest commercial talents."
successful,

When a Scots factor became

"he thought of returning to Glasgow and becoming a

partner in a Virginia house."49

While the stabilization of the

price of tobacco and insurance of independence ranked as the most
important aspects of the Port Bill, the division of retailers from
importers was crucial to the subsequent development of Virginia
commerce.

Madison believed this separation represented "the only

radical cure for credit to the consumer."50
Madison

was

not

alone

in

blaming

Virginia's

difficulties on the return of the British merchants.

commercial

George Mason

scrutinized the motives of the British merchants when his son,
Thomson Mason,
factory.

and William Allison tried to establish a snuff

He feared "the Attempts of the British Merchants

ruin] such a Manufacture here."

[to

To assist the fledgling industry,

"they [Th. Mason and Allison] have presented [a] Petition to the
Assembly,

for laying a Duty up[on]

Countrys."51

Snuff imported from Foreign

Benjamin Harrison described the British merchants as

"locusts that are crouding us here as so many emissaries sent to
sound out inclinations and to poison the minds of our people."
Their ultimate goal was to bring Virginia "back to their old and

49Price, "The Rise of Glasgow in the Chesapeake Tobacco Trade,
1707-1775," The William and Mary Quarterly. 3d Series, XXI (1954),
p. 197-198.
50James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (August 20, 1785),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VIII, p. 345
51George Mason to William Cabell (May 6, 1783), Rutland,
The Papers of Georae Mason. II, p. 769.
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destructive paths.”52 These fears recalled the reasons cited by the
House of Delegates in 1777 when they exiled the British merchants.
The war had reached a critical

stage,

and Virginians

felt the

necessity to remove "all the natives of Great Britain who were
partners

with,

keepers,

or

factors,

agents,

clerks,” for

storekeepers,

otherwise

they

assistant

would

have

store

"frequent

opportunities of seducing and corrupting the minds of the people."53
Richard Henry Lee did not trust the insidious influence of foreign
mercantile interests, as "the Spirit of Commerce is a Spirit of
Avarice, and whatever the power is given the will certainly follows
to monopolize, to engross, and to take every possible advantage."54
British merchants wish only "for monopoly - And the more especially
as we have no compensation to make."

Lee "believed that we may

dispose them to be reasonable, by a very careful, and considerate
restraining of their Trade, in all cases where we shall not injure
ourselves more than them by the restraint."55
Many suspected a covert plan behind the merchants' activities,

“Benjamin Harrison to the Virginia Delegates in Congress,
(September 26, 1783), Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James
Madison, VII, p. 359.
“Virginia Gazette (Williamsburg), January 3, 1777: quoted in
Emory Evans, "Private Indebtedness and the Revolution in Virginia,
1776-1796," The William and Mary Quarterly. 3d series, XXVIII
(1971), p. 352
“Richard
Richard Henry
York, 1970;
1914), II, p.

Henry Lee to -, (October 10, 1785), The Letters of
Lee, edited James Curtis Ballagh, (DaCapo Press, New
reprinted from the original series published 1911389.

“Richard Henry Lee to James Madison, (August 11, 1785),
Ballagh, The Letters of Richard Henry Lee. II, p. 383.
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but Arthur Campbell openly accused the British of a conspiracy.
"If

my

intelligence

Campbell

told

from

Madison,

a

distant

"Great

Correspondent,

Britain

from

the

is

right,"

moment

she

acknowledged our independence, set about devising means to render
it of no avail."

The essence of this perfidious plot resided in

"what she has already done, by introducing luxury, draining our
money, impairing public credit, and destroying public spirit."

The

threat required the vigilance of every patriot in defending the
republic, for one "may discover, that she [Great Britain] will be
systematical, in aiming at our destruction."56
Establishing a single port at Norfolk would encourage the
growth of that city as a major commercial center.

Writing in

response to a query from Jefferson, George Washington expressed no
anxiety over the possibility of a southern Philadelphia arising.
He believed "[Commerce] has its advantages and disadvantages, but
which of them preponderates

is not

the question."

Washington

realized that "from trade our citizens will not be restrained, and
therefore

it

behooves

us

to

place

it

in

the

most

convenient

channels, under proper regulation, freed as much as possible from
these vices which luxury,
naturally introduce."57

the consequence of wealth and power,

The Port Bill succeeded in the goal of

56Arthur Campbell to James Madison, (October 28, 1783),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VII, p. 383.
57George Washington to Thomas Jefferson, (March 29, 1784),
The Writings of Georae Washington from the Original Manuscript
Sources. 1745-1799. edited by John Fitzgerald, (Washington, 1938),
XXVII, p. 376
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regulating Virginia's commerce to Washington's satisfaction, and
he supported the measure ’’with some alterations."
"without

it,

the Trade thereof

I conceive will

He feared that
ever

labor and

languish. "58
Jefferson

also

supported

the

restrictions

another argument to Madison's defense of the bill.
limiting

trade

to Norfolk would

"bring to

and

contributed

He claimed that

a point

the

proper

subjects of taxation, and reduce the army of taxgatherers almost
to a single hand."

The isolation of the merchants to a single

location in Virginia also enhanced the prospects for the bill.

His

reasoning closely followed the explanations provided in Notes on
the State of Virginia for the superiority of the yeoman farmer.
He argued that "the proportion which the aggregate of the other
classes of citizens bears in any state to that of the husbandmen,
is the proportion of its unsound to its healthy parts, and is a
good

enough

barometer

whereby

to

measure

its

degree

of

corruption."59 The removal of European merchants from interaction
with the general public helped to preserve the "healthy parts" of
society.
Not all Virginians agreed with Jefferson's arguments.

Any

defense of the Port Bill that drew attention to its effects upon
the collection of taxes undermined support for the measure in the

58George Washington to James Madison,
Fitzgerald, The Writings of Georcre Washington. XXVIII, p. 336
59Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Vircrinia. edited by
William Peden, (WW Norton, New York, 1982).
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House of Delegates.

George Mason, Richard Henry Lee, and other

republicans opposed the Port Bill on ideological grounds and out
of

concern

Virginia.
well

as

for

its

effects

upon

the

economic

development

of

All agreed that the cycles of debt and dependency as
the

Commonwealth

increasingly
required

quick

sour
and

economic
deliberate

condition
action

to

of

the

save

the

republic, but for Mason and Lee, the Port Bill was not the way to
go.
over

The continuing debate over the Port Bill sparked discussion
the

nature

of

free

trade

and

ruptured

the

republican

conception of political economy in favor of a new synthesis.

CHAPTER TWO
THE END OF REPUBLICAN CONSENSUS

After
access

of

Tazewell

introduced

foreign merchants

the

resolution

to Virginia's

quickly generated discontent

to

ports,

throughout the

restrict
the

the

proposal

commonwealth.

The

House of Delegates resolved for the legislation in the affirmative
on June 17, 1784, by a vote of sixty-four to fifty-eight, but the
final

draft

execution

of

of

the

bill

included

the law until

June

a

clause

that

10,

1786.1

The

deferred
delay

the

in the

implementation of the Port Bill provided its numerous opponents
with the opportunity to diminish support for the measure.

The

ripples of dissent soon reached the marketplace that summer and
provided
republic.

an

uncertain

future

for

Madison's

plan

to

save

the

Usually people bustling about the streets of Richmond

directed their

attention to the

"weather,

the market

price

of

tobacco, and horses for riding, racing, pulling or plowing."2

By

1JHDV. General Assembly begun at Richmond, May 3, 1784, p. 61;
also see William Walker Hening, ed., The Statutes at Large; Being
a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia. (Richmond, 1823;
reprinted for the Jamestown Foundation, University Press of
Virginia, Charlottesville, 1969), XI, p. 402-404
2William Fogg to - Fogg, (October 24, 1786), University of
Virginia Library: Quoted in Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of
James Madison. IX, p. 147
30
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August 1784 however, the Port Bill became a focus for political
arguments
Delegates.

from

the

Madison

local

merchant's

recognized

the

store

to

increasing

the

level

House
of

of

public

discourse on matters of trade and commented that "the act which
produces the most agitation and discussion is that which restrains
foreign trade to enumerated ports."3
The continuing debate over the Port Bill through 1787 sparked
a discussion concerning the proper role for commercial development
in

a

republican

Virginians

society.

A

consensus

for most of the decade.

on

that

issue

eluded

The disagreement over the

effects of the Port Bill demonstrated how economic concerns shaped
republican conceptions of society in a substantially different way
from social or political interests.

Republicans of all stripes

believed in the elimination of mercantilist restraints on commerce
to free planters

from dependence on merchants.

While Madison,

Jefferson, and Henry supported republican regulations on trade to
preserve public virtue and the economic viability of the planter
class, Mason and Lee opposed such regulations as a threat to virtue
because they encouraged the development of

commercial

centers.

Advocates for the Port Bill sought to create a native merchant
class

to

save

the

planters

from

foreign

merchants,

while

its

adversaries believed that any merchant class would cripple the
planters and undermine the republican social order.
Geographic considerations forced an increase in the number of

3James Madison to Thomas Jefferson,
(August 20, 1784),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VIII, p. 102
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ports of entry beyond the
favored.

During

the

single port at Norfolk that Madison

1760s,

the

James

and

York

river

basins

accounted for over fifteen percent of the tobacco exported from the
Chesapeake.

By

1784

those

rivers

contributed

less

than

four

percent, and the Piedmont doubled its share to half of the total
exports.4 Jefferson realized that "friends of Petersburg, Richmond,
Fredericksburg,

and

Alexandria

may

possibly

exclusive privileges being given to Norfolk."
"all

the

country

below

these

which

compose

unite

to

prevent

He believed that
one

third

legislature are interested in the prosperity of Norfolk?

of

the

and all

the country above stands indifferent but to the general interest."5
Madison "made a warm struggle for the establishment of Norfolk and
Alexandria" as the only ports of entry,

but political necessity

forced him to compromise with delegates from elsewhere in Virginia
to save the measure.6

The bill presented to the House on June 9

stipulated

ships

that

commonwealth

"the

[Virginia]

and

other

vessels

trading

to

from foreign ports... shall enter,

out, load and unload, at the following places, to wit:

this
clear

Norfolk and

Portsmouth as one port, Bermuda hundred, Tappahanock, York Town,

4Alan Kulikoff, Tobacco and Slaves. p. 157;
also see Jacob
Price, France and the Chesapeake: A History of the French Tobacco
Monopoly, 1764-1791, and of Its Relationship to the British and
American Tobacco Trade. (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor,
1973), II, chapter 28
5Thomas Jefferson to G.K. van Hogendorp, (May 1784),
Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. VII, p. 215
6James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (July 3, 1784),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VIII, p. 93
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or Alexandria,

and at no other ports or places therein."

This

provided one port of entry at the mouth of each of the five major
rivers.

The preamble incorporated Jefferson's concerns, stating

that the purpose of the bill was not only to restrict access of
foreign merchants to certain ports, but "the revenue arising from
commerce would also thereby be more certainly collected."7
After the initial bill passed the House in 1784, opposition
to Madison's plan involved broader issues than local political
requirements.

Advocates of the bill argued that free access by

merchants in a common marketplace would raise the price of tobacco
from

the

artificially

deflated

prices

under

British

monopoly.

Higher prices meant prosperity for planters, and the opportunity
to develop republican virtue within the character of the people.
While George Mason agreed that the price of tobacco would rise, he
insisted that the additional costs to the planters involved in
transporting and warehousing their crops in Norfolk would negate
any

benefit

problems,

to

the

gross
price

revenues.
of

As

manufactures

merchants
would

eroding the economic benefit to the planter.

also

faced
rise,

the

same

further

Mason questioned the

General Assembly, "Can imported goods come cheaper to the consumer,
or the produce of our lands bear a better price, by being burthened
with the double charges of commissions,
warehouse rent?"

freight,

ensurance,

and

Considering that the weight of these expenses

diminished profits, Mason wondered "are not such paradoxes, however

7Hening, Statutes, XI, p. 402-403
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artfully disguised, or plausibly explained, sufficient to shock the
creed even of the most credulous?"8
An even greater concern for Mason was the bill's effect on the
distribution

of

wealth.

The

costs

of

transporting

tobacco

privileged planters in the immediate areas of the enumerated ports.
Those along navigable water but further away from the designated
ports

would be

recognized

the

stripped of these
validity

of

the

natural
argument

advantages.
and

urged

Madison
concurrent

legislation for internal improvements to Virginia's transportation
network.

He introduced a resolution for opening roads to market

towns in December 1784 to minimize any additional costs to planters
in the interior.

The assembly did not approve the measure,

and

even if the house voted in the affirmative, the concession would
not have satisfied Madison's opponents.9

Mason insisted that the

Port Bill required additional legislation to restructure land taxes
to prevent a shortfall in revenues to the government.

While Mason

considered "robbing" planters of natural advantages itself an "act
of injustice, oppression, and tyranny," the required adjustments
to tax laws risked "destroying a system universally approved."
clash

of

political

interests

over

the

issue

would

result

The
in

"general discontent, confusion, anarchy, and perhaps, convulsion

8Protest by "A Private Citizen" against the Port
(November 1786), Rutland, The Papers of George Mason. II,
p. 859-862

Bill,

9"Resolution for Opening Roads to Market Towns,"
(December 1784), Hutchinson and Rachal, Papers of James Madison.
VIII, p. 207-208
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in the

state."

impoverish
traded

He

planters

formerly

exclusively
Norfolk.10

in

also

speculated

along

in

the

both

Maryland

that

Potomac

Maryland
rather

than

the

river,

and

Port
as

would

merchants

Virginia

relocate

Bill

would

their

who
load

trade

to

Mason realized that the British merchants represented

a possible threat to republican virtue and that their presence
might

encourage

a

return

to

subservience

under

George

III.

However, he also believed the Port Bill would only accelerate the
degenerative process and drive Virginians into the arms of their
former king in the wake of economic ruin.
Mason also appealed to the republican notion that the effects
of commercial development corrupted virtue.

The country opposition

in England did not oppose commerce, but the effects they believed
resulted from mercantile activity, including commercial wars, land
taxes,

factions,

merchants

represented

national wealth.
the

graft,

operation

and

the

debt.

most

Mercantilists

important

element

argued
in

that

advancing

Commerce contributed to the general good through
of

private

benefitted the public.

interests,

whose

aggregate

effect

Joseph Addison recognized that "there are

not more useful Members in a Commonwealth than Merchants.
knit Mankind together in a mutual

They

intercourse of good offices,

[and] distribute the Gifts of Nature."

However, their unregulated

enterprises also favored commercial over landed interests, which

10"Protest by a Private Citizen,"
(November 1786),
Rutland, The Papers of George Mason. II, p. 860-862
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threatened to undermine the virtue republican ideology presumed.11
Mason followed this argument and asked "if virtue is the vital
principle

of

a

republic,

and

it

cannot

long

frugality, probity and strictness of morals?

exist,

without

will the manners of

populous commercial cities be favorable to the principles of our
free government?"12 The argument hinged on the evolutionary theory
of social development advanced by Montesqieu and fully articulated
by Adam Smith.

Smith identified four stages of society:

pasturage, agriculture, and commerce.

hunting,

As social systems matured,

nations followed a natural pattern of change from one stage to the
next.

Eighteenth-century

theorists

associated

the

third,

or

agricultural stage, with American society, and the final commercial
stage with Great Britain.

The development of a fully commercial

society was inevitable in America under this model, but republicans
hoped

to

prolong

the

agricultural

stage

to

avoid

as

long

as

possible the corruption of virtue.13
John

Brown's

manuscript,

"An

Estimate

of the

Manners

and

Principles of the Times," typified republican attitudes towards
commercialism.

Brown found that the middle stages of development

promoted convenience, arts, science, equality of the laws, and a

aiCathy Matson and Peter Onuf, A Union of Interests: Political
and Economic Thought in Revolutionary America. (University of
Kansas Press, Lawrence, 1990), p. 17-20
“ "Protest by a Private Citizen,"
(November 1786),
Rutland, The Papers of George Mason. II, p. 862
“See the discussion in McCoy's The Elusive Republic,
esp. p. 18-24
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diffusion of the material prosperity.

Agriculture allowed the

cultivation of virtue which maintained freedom.

Commercial society

bred "superfluity and vast wealth, promoting avarice, gross luxury,
and effeminacy among the higher ranks of men."14

Progress was a

double-edged sword, intrinsically linked to the decay of society.
Republicans thus denounced urbanization as symptomatic of a corrupt
and

withering

state,

and

Mason

believed

that

precipitated the introduction of commercial forms.

the

Port

Bill

While the final

draft incorporated five locations as ports of entry instead of a
single commercial center at Norfolk,

even this concession ceded

ground in the struggle to contain corruption.
delegates

to

consider

that

people

are

Mason urged the

"more

miserable

and

contemptible in the last, than in the early and middle stages" of
evolution.

"And is it not safer and wiser to leave things to the

natural progress of time, than to hasten them, prematurely?"15
Madison

believed

that

restricting

the

access

of

foreign

merchants was the only way to halt an explosion of commercial
development through capital investments.
unsound

to

Mason,

who

believed

the

This solution appeared

consequent

development

of

commercial centers, however few in number, created the same forces
that Madison

designed the

Port

Bill

to

eliminate.

The model

republican society represented the "idealization of a traditional,
static, agricultural economy in which freeholders did not depend

14Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic, p. 33
^"Protest by a Private Citizen," Rutland, The Papers of George
Mason, II, p. 862-863
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on

credit

at

enterprises."
of the

landed

interest

or

risk

theirproperty

in

speculative

Republicans recognized that "the lasting prosperity
interest depends

upon

foreign

commerce,"

but

it

appeared to Mason that many of his countrymen were prepared to
elevate

commerce

beyond

a

complementary

role

and

into

an

independent economic force divorced from the landed interests.

At

best, this move would sacrifice the patient to cure the disease,
and

might

even

encourage

the growth

of

manufacturing

over

pasturage.16
Madison did
Monroe

that

"it

not ease these fears.
is

He complained to James

difficult notwithstanding

to

make

them

[Virginians] sensible of the utility of establishing a Philadelphia
or a Baltimore among ourselves, as one indispensable step towards
relief."17 What appeared to Madison as the means to economic growth
appeared to Richard Henry Lee and other republicans as the sure
route to social decline.

While Madison claimed that his intentions

centered on the preservation of the landed interests, Lee and Mason
recognized that the Port Bill threatened the traditional social
order in favor of a commercial society.18 Richard Henry Lee voiced
16Matson and Onuf, A Union Of Interests, p. 13-17
17James Madison to James Monroe, (June 21, 1785),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VIII, p. 307
18Drew McCoy argued in The Elusive Republic that, like
Jefferson, Madison defended the interests of the landed aristocracy
into the nineteenth century.
The Louisiana Purchase and the War
of 1812 are thus manifestations of the attempt to preserve the
landed order.
This interpretation distances Madison from his
former association with Hamilton accorded by previous historians.
However, given the positions taken over the Port Bill controversy,
it is not surprising how Lee and others could have seen Madison as
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his opposition to the free reign of commercial development during
the war,
crisis.

and

it seemed that Madison sought to perpetuate that

In 1779, Lee commented to Mason that "the inundation of

money appears to have overflowed virtue, and I fear will bury the
liberty

of

extortion,

America

in

the

same

grave...the

demon

of

and fortune-making seizes all ranks.”19

avarice,

Establish a

commercial center at Norfolk and others along each of the rivers,
and before long Virginia would resemble Holland, "an immense heap
of Mammon, where every weakness prevails consequent upon excessive
wealth."20

Mason agreed with the bleak prognosis, as Holland "is

well known to be a republic," yet "it has arisen to uncommon power
and

wealth."21

stadtholder

in

He

believed

Holland

consolidation

augmented

the

power

of

power

of

the

in

commercial

interests, destroying any virtue remaining in the state.
Madison

did

not

propose

the

ascendancy

of

the

the

While

merchants

to

political dominance, the creation of a southern Philadelphia would
augment

the

commonwealth

influence
by

of

the

consolidating

mercantile
their

power

interests
in

the

within

the

Chesapeake.

a promoter of the same agenda Hamilton championed.
19Richard Henry Lee to George Mason, (June 9, 1779),
Rutland, The Papers of George Mason. II, p. 513-514
20Richard Henry Lee to Thomas McKean, (August 25, 1781),
Ballagh, The Letters of Richard Henry L e e . II, p. 247-248
21Debates and other Proceedings of the Convention of Virginia.
Convened at Richmond.
on Monday the
2d of June
1788....
(Petersburg, 1788? 2d edition, Richmond, 1805 by Ritchie & Worsley
and Augustine Davis), Special Collections, Swem Library,
The College of William and Mary, p. 194
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Without enumerated ports of entry, merchants would scatter across
the state,
economic

and their influence could be diffused.

opportunities

interaction
trade.

preserved

of

the

their

British

merchants

complimentary

role

Limiting the
to

in

individual
the

tobacco

Concentration of their resources in enumerated ports risked

the development of capital markets and speculation.
While the social consequences of the Port Bill worried Mason
more than any other consideration,
this

opposition

dissent.

represented

the

it is mistake to assume that
majority

opinion

of

those

in

The most vehement and unified opposition to Madison's

plan originated in northern Virginia,

and throughout the 1780s,

planters along the northern neck were unceasing in their complaints
to the legislature over its economic repercussions.22

The most

pressing argument against the Port Bill was its limitations on the
doctrine of free trade.

The continued presence of restraints upon

the free flow of commercial trade bothered Richard Henry Lee, who
"grievously...lament[ed] that this is fully and fatally the case
in

our

unfortunate

country."

Such

restrictions

only

caused

hardship and inequality, as "the free nature and genius of commerce
abhors and shuns restraint."

He believed "that in young commercial

states, to embarrass Trade with heavy imposts or other clogs, is

22Dissent also concentrated around the immediate area of
Norfolk's rival ports.
See W. Augustus Low, Virginia in the
Critical Period. 1783-1789. (unpubl. PhD. diss., University of
Iowa, 1941), p. 146 and map VI, p. 215
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effectually to demolish it."23

Lee's protests aimed primarily at

the attempts by the Congress at Philadelphia to implement an impost
tax on imported goods, but the ideological opposition carried over
to the debate on the Port Bill.

Abandoning restraint as a solution

to Virginia's commercial difficulties would place trade "upon more
liberal principles," and allow commerce to be "less shackled than
it is."24 Restricting foreign merchants embarrassed the commercial
relations

between

Virginia

and

Europe

and

substituted

the

domination of British vessels for those of New England traders.25
Madison

recognized

that

self-interest

motivated

the

ideological commitment to free trade on the part of planters along
the northern neck.

He accused the Lees and Masons of wishing to

gain advantages from "large ships coming up and lying at their
usual stations in the Rivers," and using free trade as a political
tool to convince other Virginians that "trade ought in all cases
to be left to regulate itself."26

This strategy maintained the

status quo where the Lees and Masons profited from economies of
scale.

Clearly a Scots merchant would be willing to give a great

planter a better price than he would a small planter, because the

23Richard Henry Lee to James Monroe, (January 5, 1784),
Ballagh, The Letters of Richard Henry L e e . II, p. 289
24Richard Henry Lee to Thomas Jefferson, (May 16, 1785),
Ballagh, The Letters of Richard Henry L e e . II, p. 358
25Richard Henry Lee to John Jay, (September 11, 1785),
Ballagh, The Letters of Richard Henry L e e . II, p. 389
26James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (August 20, 1784),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VIII, p. 102
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crop from a large plantation could fill a greater portion of the
hull

in a merchant

ship.

These

deals

dramatically reduced

a

captain's turn-around time, and while the merchant lost some gross
revenues

from the higher price,

the diminished operating costs

increased the net return and thus improved profit margins.

Madison

considered it improbable that the great planters along the northern
neck would support the measure.
Port

Bill]

undeniable

escape... it
facts."

will

He commented that "should it [the
be

owing

to

a

few

The price on tobacco was

striking

high

and

immediately

following the war, however "this will not last if debt outstrips
[the] planter."27

Those most likely to fall victim to the price

deflation were small planters upon whose support Madison's plan to
save the republic depended.

The grand purpose behind the scheme

concerned the extension of the republican form of political economy
over both time and space.
creation

of

a

new

yeomen

While western expansion promised the
class

in

Kentucky,

the

Port

Bill

guaranteed the maintenance of the yeomen class in Virginia.

The

unenlightened self-interest of the northern neck elites disrupted
the cultivation of virtue on the farms of America.

27James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (August 20, 1784),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison, VIII, p. 103

CHAPTER THREE
THE PRINCIPLE OF FAIR TRADE

Many
political

historians
life

in

have

America

discussed
from

the

colonial

transformation

subservience

to

of
the

emergence of a democratic society following the Revolution.1 While
there

is some variation

among scholars on the way this change

occurred, a consensus exists that after the Revolution, classical
liberalism

slowly

emerged

political thought.2

as

the

dominant

theme

in

American

Almost from its inception, according to one

historian, liberalism "has been plural and diverse," encompassing
a broad ideological spectrum.
causes

varied

"both

in

While the basis for many liberal

political

positions

and

in

conceptual

underpinnings," a set of fundamental beliefs provided commonality

1See J. Franklin Jameson, The American Revolution Considered
as a Social Movement. (Princeton University Press, New York, 1926),
Daniel Boorstin, The Genius of American Politics. (University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953), Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition
in America. (Harcourt, Brace, and World, New York, 1955), and
Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution. (Alfred A.
Knopf, New York, 1992).
2See Ralph Lerner, "Commerce and Character: The Anglo-American
as New-Model Man," The William and Marv Quarterly. 3d Series, XXXVI
(January 1979), p. 3-27, Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social
Order. The Republican Vision of the 1790s. (New York University
Press, New York, 1984), and esp. Cathy Matson and Peter Onuf,
A Union of Interests:____ Political and Economic Thought in
Revolutionary America. (University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, 1990)
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within this diversity.

The doctrine of "free trade" was widely

accepted as one of these core beliefs.3
Accepting "free trade" as a fundamental tenet of classical
liberalism

confronts

interesting

the

problem.

student

Throughout

of

American

most

of

its

history
colonial

with

an

period,

America remained under the mercantilist system of the British, far
removed from free trade.
political

ideology

in

As liberalism slowly transformed American
the

nineteenth

should have conformed to this doctrine.

century,

commercial

laws

However, the United States

maintained strongly protectionist policies during the balance of
its

early

national

period.

Almost

immediately

following

the

Revolution, several legislatures favored considerable restrictions
on

trade

with

the

British,

and

restraints on all foreign trade.

some

even

desired

these

same

In 1783, Benjamin Harrison wrote

to the Virginia delegation in Philadelphia and "enclosed the copy
of an act of the

[Virginia]

general

assembly to authorize the

united states in Congress to adopt certain regulations respecting
British trade."4 Joseph Jones even remarked in a letter to Thomas
Jefferson on "the unamity and spirit [with] which the legislature
passed" the act.5

3J. G. Merquoir, Liberalism, Old and New. (Twayne/s Studies in
Intellectual and Cultural History, Boston, 1991).
4Benjamin Harrison to the Virginia Delegates in Congress,
(December 26, 1783), Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. VI,
p. 421
5Joseph Jones to Thomas Jefferson, (December 29, 1783),
Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. VI, p. 428
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If liberalism was ascendant during the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, why did "free trade" fare so poorly?
Were the many notable liberal champions of free trade during the
nineteenth

century

among

the

nation's

greatest

hypocrites,

espousing the rhetoric of one dogma and then voting for policies
that directly contradicted their supposedly lofty principles?

It

seems unlikely that political elites would need or even want to
ferment ideas about open ports and "free goods"
purpose

was

to

restrict

trade

and

protect

if their real

markets.

A

more

plausible interpretation of the apparent distance between rhetoric
and reality argues for a redefinition of the terms "liberal" and
"free trade."

Instead of accepting "free trade" as the set of

economic principles outlined by David Ricardo, and then trying to
square

those

principles

with

the

policy decisions

liberals during the antebellum period,

of American

a more fruitful analysis

would focus on the development of the idea of free trade within
American political culture.

The earliest debates over American

free trade policies occurred in Virginia during the 1780s, and the
term acquired meaning long before Ricardo published his classic
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation in 1817.
should not be

surprising that historians

find

Thus,

it

it difficult to

square U.S. trade policies with Ricardian models of international
commerce.

In leaving aside Ricardian theory, a new definition of

"free trade" emerges from the policy debate over the Virginia Port
Bill of 1784.
The

restriction

of

commercial

exchange

between

foreign

46
merchants

and

Virginia

limited market access.

planters

to

enumerated

ports

certainly

The prohibition of mercantile activity in

places where commerce once flourished also represented a restraint
on the

freedom

Considering

of Virginians

these

effects,

to

trade with

the

Port

Bill

interpreted as an anti-free trade measure.
James

Madison

even

contended

that

the

foreign
could

merchants.
easily

be

In defense of the bill,
unrestricted

ability

of

foreign merchants to trade in Virginia gave rise to the cycles of
debt and dependence which threatened to cripple the economy of the
Old Dominion.
"free

trade”

For many of the Port Bill's opponents, who defined
as

unrestricted

abandoned the faith.

access

to

markets,

Madison

had

As far as they were concerned, Madison argued

that the unrestricted access enjoyed by foreign merchants after the
war caused Virginia's commercial difficulties, and the Port Bill
would solve the problem by severely limiting free trade.
The restrictions on commerce troubled the delegates assembled
in Richmond.

Richard Henry Lee resisted the Port Bill, as well as

Madison's later attempts to institute regulations on trade at the
federal level, because Lee feared such restrictions would lead to
the dominance of the New England merchants.6 If dependence on one
group of merchants gave rise to Virginia's commercial difficulties,
Lee wondered how replacing the British with New England merchants
solved anything.

He insisted that "the free nature and genius of

commerce abhors and shuns restraint, and that in young commercial

6Richard Henry Lee to John Jay, (September 11, 1785),
Ballagh, The Letters of Richard Henry L e e . II, p. 389
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states,

to

embarrass

Trade

with

heavy

imports

or

clogs,

is

effectually to demolish it."7 Allow trade to continue unrestricted,
and

"the

free

nature

and

genius

of

commerce"

would

create

a

competitive market between British, French, New England, and other
merchants.
To encourage competitiveness,

Lee hoped that "Congress has

seen the propriety of cultivating with assiduity the courts of
Berlin

and

capable

of

America."8

Petersburg.

The

Emperor's

being benefitted by

a trade

subjects

are

certainly

immediately with North

Already the treaty of commerce made with the French

"rests upon the liberal ground of fair equality in every part," and
Lee also concluded that the perceived British dominance resulted
from Virginia's unwillingness to repeal "her laws that impede the
recovery of British debts."9 Instead of eliminating free trade, Lee
believed that,
genius
British.

of

if Virginia paid her debts,

commerce"
After

would

the

even

benefit

legislature

passed

"the free nature and
their
the

trade
Port

with
Bill,

the
Lee

complained to Jefferson that "if trade were put upon more liberal
principles and

[be]

less shackled than it is," the benefits of

7Richard Henry Lee to James Monroe, (January 5, 1784),
Ballagh, The Letters of Richard Henry L e e . II, p. 289
8Richard Henry Lee to Thomas McKean, (August 25, 1781),
Ballagh, The Letters of Richard Henry L e e . II, p. 247-248
9Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry, (February 28, 1779),
Ballagh, The Letters of Richard Henry L e e . II, p. 36;
Richard Henry Lee to James Madison, (November 20, 1784),
Ballagh, The Letters of Richard Henry L e e . II, p. 299
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commerce might be diffused throughout society.10
Jefferson recognized that "if England can be prevailed on to
establish a liberal system of commerce, other nations will do so
too."11

Lee's concept of "free trade" represented the ideal for

Madison as well, "because the wider...our ports be opened and the
more extensive the privileges of all competitors in our Commerce,
the more likely we shall be to buy at cheap and sell at profitable
rates.1,12 Advocates for the Port Bill thus supported the ideology
of "free trade," or at least the benefits of reducing restrictions
on trade to encourage market forces to regulate commerce between
foreign merchants and Virginia planters.
bill

wondered

how

their

conflicting positions.

colleagues

However, opponents of the
could

reconcile

these

If Madison and Jefferson supported free

trade, how could they also support a measure that denied access to
foreign merchants in all places except the five enumerated ports?
Indeed, Madison claimed he supported free trade and favored the
limitation of foreign commerce to a single port at Norfolk.

A

cursory examination of their views seems to reveal a contradiction.
However, many of the Port Bill's advocates saw no conflict between
the

doctrine

of

"free

trade,"

restrictions on mercantile

access.

and

their

Madison

support

of

legal

and Jefferson even

“Richard Henry Lee to Thomas Jefferson, (May 16, 1785),
Ballagh, The Letters of Richard Henry L e e . II, p. 358
“Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton, (December 16, 1783),
Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. VI, p. 386-387
“James Madison to Edmund Randolph, (May 20, 1783),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VII, p. 59-61
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believed the Port Bill was necessary to establish free trade in
Virginia.
While unrestricted access to Virginia's markets was desirable,
Madison and Jefferson found this policy untenable in the 1780s.
Dominance by the British in America's markets precluded such an
arrangement.

Jefferson complained "that were it certain we could

be brought to act as one united nation she [Great Britain] would
make extensive concessions, but under present appearances she has
no inducement to this as she is not afraid of retaliation."13 Once
Britain secured its position in the Chesapeake, Virginia's markets
could no longer be considered "free" because one group of merchants
dominated the trade.

No legal restrictions barred other merchants

from entering the market, but the return of the Scots factors and
other British merchants had returned Virginia to its prewar cycles
of debt and dependence.

This eliminated opportunities for other

merchants to compete for contracts with planters whose outputs were
already committed to British creditors.

George Mason recognized

that "the Desire of the British Merchants to reinstate themselves
in their Trade here, will probably prevent their pressing their
Debtors."

However,

Madison

feared

the

threat

of

such

action

provided the British with enough economic leverage to eliminate
competitors.14 For these reasons Madison complained that "our trade

13Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton, (December 16, 1783),
Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. VI, p. 386-387
14George Mason to Patrick Henry, (May 6, 1783),
Rutland, The Papers of George Mason. II, p. 771
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was never more completely monopolised by Great Britain...than it
is at this moment," and under these circumstances, he considered
the unrestricted access of foreign merchants to Virginia's ports
as detrimental to the ideology of "free trade."15
admission of the British after 1783

The unchecked

and the continued lack of

regulations on trade produced a closed system dominated by the
British instead of the competitive market envisioned by Lee.
Madison agreed with Lee's position that Virginia's commercial
policies needed to encourage competition and create "free markets."
Lee endorsed "free access"

in an effort to establish a liberal

system of commerce where governments did not favor certain groups
over

others.

He

feared

that

restrictions

and

regulations

discouraged competition and promoted closed markets which elevated
particular individuals to positions of dominance.

Lee advocated

the unrestricted admission of foreign merchants to guarantee free
access and thus to insure "free trade."

Madison's defense of the

Port Bill established an important distinction for his definition
of

"free trade."

For Madison,

any policy that inhibited free

market competition inhibited free trade.
trade

suffered whenever

He believed that free

a policy allowed one group to achieve

dominance within a market, and in the 1780s, unrestricted or free
access permitted the British to secure a dominant position in the
Chesapeake.

To sustain "free trade," Virginia needed to insure

"equal access," not "free access," and the Port Bill accomplished

15James Madison to James Monroe, (June 21, 1785),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VIII, p. 307
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this

goal

by

first

restricting

foreign commerce

to

enumerated

ports, and then encouraging the development of a native merchant
class.
The final clause of the Port Bill "specifically encouraged the
development

of

native

seaman,"

and

for

this

reason

some

have

interpreted the Port Bill as a "classic mercantilist measure."16
However, this aspect of the law occupies a minor clause and was
not a matter of considerable interest to either its author or its
most

faithful

advocates.

Instead

of

a mercantilist

measure,

proponents of the Port Bill saw the creation of a native class of
seamen as the only way to establish a competitive trade between New
England,

British and Virginian merchants.

Rather than exclude

British in favor of American merchants to create a closed market,
the Port Bill limited the British to promote an open market through
balanced trade.
Britain,

New

To attain a balance among the merchants from Great
England,

and

Virginia,

the

bill

encouraged the development of native seamen."

"specifically

In contrast, the

original British navigation acts, a "classic mercantilist measure,"
prohibited Dutch merchants from trading in any colonial port.

The

Navigation Acts removed Dutch dominance from the region and insured
a British monopoly of the trans-Atlantic trade.
Bill

limited

British

dominance

of

the

While the Port

Chesapeake,

it

also

encouraged competition between all merchants, foreign and American.
Mercantilism called for the direction of the economy by the state

16Drew McCoy, "The Port Bill of 1784," The Virginia Magazine
of History and Biography. LXXXIII (July 1975), p. 293
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for

the

interests

of

the

merchants;

the

Port

Bill

provided

direction of the economy by the state for the protection of the
planters and the interests of the consumer.
thus

be

interpreted

as

an

attempt

to

The Port Bill should

create

fair

trade

by

eliminating debt and dependence and not as a "classic mercantilist
measure."

If the advocates of the Port Bill intended to create a

new set of navigation acts, it is unlikely that the measure could
have passed the House at all.

At the ratifying convention for the

Federal Constitution in 1788, Governor Edmund Randolph, who did not
support

the

Port

Bill,

remarked

that

"[England's]

success

commerce is generally ascribed to her navigation act.

in

Virginia

would not, encumbered as she is, agree to have such an act."17 At
the

time

Randolph

made

the

remark,

Virginia

authorities

had

restricted the access of foreign merchants to enumerated ports for
nearly two years.
Madison

believed

legislative action to

the

Port

Bill

provided

the

necessary

forcibly create an open port and a free

market by insuring competition through equal access.

Restriction

of market access appeared to some as a protectionist measure, but
Madison asserted it provided the only feasible way to maintain a
"free market."

Madison argued the measure supported "free trade"

because it insured free market competition.

Restrictions on trade

17Debates and other Proceedings of the Convention of Virginia.
Convened at Richmond. on Monday the 2d of June.
1788....
(Petersburg, 1788; 2d edition, Richmond, 1805 by Ritchie & Worsley
and Augustine Davis), Special Collections, Swem Library, The
College of William and Mary, p. 66
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and

the

limitation

of

access

do

not

necessarily

restrictions upon the principle of "free trade."

result

in

"It is possible

that experience may never recommend an exercise of this right, nor
do

my

own

sentiments

favor

in

general,

any

restrictions

or

preferences in matters of commerce," but he claimed that a need for
government action did arise in Virginia after the war.18 The Port
Bill restricted access, yet upheld the principle of "free trade"
without employing the duties and regulations characteristic of the
British

mercantile

system.

The

removal

of

the

Scots

factors

prevented a return to the prewar cycles of debt and dependency, and
commercial

transactions with

foreign merchants

could no

longer

interfere with the virtuous pursuit of the public good within a
republican society.
Madison's definition of "free trade" focused the debate on the
access of foreign merchants, and clearly favored equality at the
expense of freedom.

An absence of legal regulations on commerce

provides individual merchants and planters with freedom to operate
within

the

"unfair"

market,

advantage

until
and

one

group

excludes

of

merchants

others

from

acquires
that

an

market.

Unrestricted access produced commercial domination, not free trade.
The presence of legal restrictions on commerce limits the freedom
of individual planters or merchants to participate in the market.
Government regulations that insure equal opportunity and access to
every

individual

who

wishes

to

enter

the

market

encourage

18James Madison to Edmund Randolph, (May 20, 1783),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VII, p. 61
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competition and thus support free trade.
after the war,

In the case of Virginia

such measures became necessary to establishing a

free market.
While most of the delegates on either side of the debate over
the Port Bill supported either Lee's or Madison's position on "free
trade," a protectionist minority existed within the legislature as
well.

Benjamin

Harrison

resented

the

continuation

of

British

commercial dominance after the war and recommended that "perhaps
it would not be amiss to prohibit the import of their manufactures
altogether 'till they open their ports to us."

In late 1783 he

believed the Virginia delegates "disposed to adopt any measures
that the other states may be willing to come into to bring down the
British."19

Harrison's

proposals

even

hinted

at

the

possible

institution of an American navigation act when he suggested that
Congress prohibit "West India commodities except when brought by
our own vessels."20
Madison's conceptual treatment of "free trade" established an
important

principle

classical

liberalism

within
did

American

emerge

as

political
an

thought.

influential

While

ideological

system in the nineteenth century, American liberals did not insist
upon an absolute or traditional interpretation of "free trade."
For Madison, trade could not be free unless it supported market

19Benjamin Harrison to the Virginia Delegates in Congress,
(November 14, 1783), Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. VI,
p. 354
20Benjamin Harrison to the Virginia Delegates in Congress,
(October 3, 1783), Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. VI, p. 366
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competition.

His position thus outlined a principle that is better

understood as "fair trade."
nineteenth-century

Armed with this new principle, many

American

policymakers

supported

protective

tariffs while also arguing for the cause of liberalism.
these

individuals

as

"fair traders"

Accepting

in the tradition of James

Madison, their positions on the tariff appear less opportunistic
and fully within the American liberal tradition.

Emily Rosenberg

has already accounted for this principle in the minds of American
liberals during the Progressive era.

Rosenberg observed that "in

practice, the faith in liberal rules of economic exchange had an
important qualification...Those who favored protective tariffs on
foreign goods expressed their liberalism in terms of equal access,
or the open door."

These progressives did not abandon liberal

goals in favor of protectionism, but continued the legacy of fair
trade

established

in

the

1780s.

"For

much

of

the

twentieth

century, both low-tariff and protectionist interests agreed that
equal access for trade and investment,

rather than the absolute

doctrine of free trade, provided the fundamental ingredient of a
liberal order."21
The

recognition

of

fair,

rather

than

free,

trade

as

a

fundamental tenet of classical liberalism establishes an important
analytical tool and provides an antecedent in the early national
period for America's open door policies.

Understanding Madison's

21Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream:
American
Economic and Cultural Expansionf 1890-1945. (Hill and Wang,
New York, 1982), esp. p. 3-37

arguments

for

free

trade

through

government

restrictions

also

bridges the gap between the doctrines of liberal developmentalism
and the traditionally high tariff barriers enacted after 1816.
Rosenberg astutely observed that "liberal protectionists" in the
late nineteenth century believed "nations...had the right to use
tariffs to develop their own special endowments, as long as the
duties did not discriminate in favor of certain trading partners
and

create

arguments

privileged
for

the

spheres

Port

of

Bill

influence."

never

reached

While

Madison's

this

level

of

sophistication, the beginnings of "liberal protectionism," or "fair
trade" are clearly in evidence.
Whether or not the Port Bill would have stimulated Virginia's
economy and maintained the profitability of tobacco into the next
century will never be known.
June 10,

1786,

Virginia

in

While the Port Bill took effect on

the ratification of the Federal Constitution by

1788

superseded

the

regulating interstate commerce.

Virginia

law's

provisions

for

Even if the enumeration of ports

continued after 1788, its effects would have been marginal after
the invention of the cotton gin.
tobacco
urgency

as

the

to

major

maintain

cash

Within a decade, cotton surpassed

crop

profit

for the

margins

on

commonwealth,
tobacco

and the

diminished.

Ironically, the most visible effect of the Port Bill between 17861788 was an increase in tariff revenues, although Madison claimed
that the bill produced the intended effect of raising the price of
tobacco

from

implementation.

20/.

to

25/.

within

a

few

months

of

its

However, none of his other four concerns met with
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any success during the bill's brief life.22
legislative success,
provided

a

liberalism.

crucial

Despite this limited

the debate over the Port Bill in the 1780s
stage

in

the

development

of

classical

Madison's argument for competition and equality as the

key measures of free trade established the ideological origins in
America for the principle of "fair trade," and contributed to the
evolution from Republican virtue to Liberal progress.

22James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (December 4, 1786),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. IX, p. 192
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